We Teach Morality, But Do We Teach Religious Coexistence?
by Tamim Muntasir
by Tamim Muntasir
Published on: October 10, 2026
Religious coexistence in Bangladesh concerns more than communities sharing national territory. It concerns whether citizens can participate in public life without their beliefs becoming grounds for suspicion or exclusion. The constitutional framework itself accommodates different commitments: Article 2A establishes Islam as the state religion while guaranteeing equal status and religious practice to other religions, whereas Article 12 affirms secularism and the elimination of communalism. The frequently invoked “secularism versus Islam” debate is therefore better examined as a contest over state authority, national identity, and citizenship than as an inevitable opposition between religious belief and equal rights. Majority–minority relations bring these questions into everyday life. Insecurity among Hindu citizens has followed attacks, including the killing of Dipu Chandra Das after allegations of religious insult. The then interim government disputed claims about the extent and religious motivation of violence. These disagreements make careful documentation essential; they do not make minority experiences irrelevant. Nor should particular incidents be treated as evidence that all Muslims share one political position. The educational question is how belonging can be understood through equal citizenship rather than through a majority’s discretionary acceptance of minorities.
The Shahbag and Shapla Square confrontations provide an important historical reference. In 2013, Shahbag protesters demanded harsher punishment for crimes committed during the Liberation War, while Hefazat-e-Islam mobilised around demands including punishment for alleged blasphemy. Human Rights Watch documented violence and excessive state force surrounding these protests. Study shows how competing narratives constructed antagonistic identities. These divisions cannot simply be mapped onto separate religious communities; they also concern differences within Muslim society over history, expression, and public morality. Teaching this history requires distinguishing competing claims from collective accusations. Extremism and terrorism create a related educational dilemma. Preventing violence requires examining its justification and recruitment mechanisms without treating religious observance, conservative belief, or peaceful disagreement as evidence of violent intent. UNESCO emphasises human-rights-based education, critical thinking, and respectful classroom discussion. The relevant educational response is therefore neither silence about violence nor suspicion directed at particular pupils. It is preparation to evaluate claims, challenge dehumanisation, and respond safely to intimidation.
Textbooks are important because they give selected descriptions of society institutional authority. The Georgetown–BRAC study, Faith and Education in Bangladesh, examines how textbooks communicate national identity, religious difference, and social cohesion. Its analysis identifies limited opportunities for dialogue across and within religious traditions. The significance extends beyond whether minority communities appear somewhere in a book. A community presented only through festivals or exemplary personalities may be visible without becoming intelligible as a collection of ordinary people with diverse experiences, disagreements, and rights.
Religious education consequently faces a pedagogical question, not simply a theological one. Does a lesson ask children to repeat that tolerance is desirable, or does it help them recognise intolerance and respond? UNESCO’s global citizenship framework distinguishes cognitive, socio-emotional, and behavioural learning, making this distinction useful for evaluating religious education. Bangladesh’s textbooks contain substantial moral language; the central issue is whether they connect it to practical competencies. Textbook content alone cannot establish classroom effects. What teachers explain, how pupils participate, and what assessments reward must also be examined. A capable teacher may develop dialogue beyond the printed exercises.
For Islamic Studies, the 2026 syllabus covers belief, religious law, worship, moral conduct, and exemplary lives. Islam, Hussain and Orthy’s textbook study records an earlier task asking pupils to write five sentences about good relations with neighbours. This checks understanding of a moral obligation, but does not itself rehearse listening to opposing accounts or resolving a neighbourhood dispute. The study also documents a secondary-level rejection of terrorism, confirming that religious instruction addresses social harm as well as belief. The issue is how such commitments become responses to situations. Hindu Religion Studies similarly combines belief and practice with moral formation. The 2026 syllabus includes creation, religious customs, yoga, ethical teachings in scriptures, and exemplary religious lives. In an earlier textbook, the documented exercise asks pupils to explain honesty and identify honest people they know. It encourages moral recognition in everyday life; it does not itself ask learners to test competing claims or negotiate disagreement. The distinction is educational rather than a judgement that religious virtues lack public value. Practical application would require attention to the relationships in which ethical dilemmas arise.
Christian Religion Studies makes social relationships explicit through chapters on freedom, social responsibility, and transformation, including “Violence and Peace.” A documented group exercise asks students to identify where justice exists or is absent, produce a poster, and present their findings. This moves beyond individual recall into collective social analysis. It is meaningful counterevidence to a blanket claim that practical learning is absent. Still, evaluating injustice is not equivalent to practising mediation or deciding how to respond safely to intimidation. Such activities provide a foundation that further exercises could develop.
Across these examples, the distinction is between moral intention and an observable learning task. The Georgetown–BRAC analysis likewise identifies insufficient attention to actual intergroup tensions and unequal majority–minority relations. These findings support a qualified conclusion: opportunities for practising coexistence appear less developed than its moral vocabulary. They do not establish that every textbook lacks practical activities. Nor can counting references to “peace” demonstrate that pupils can manage disagreement. The stronger test is whether learners practise listening, checking evidence, recognising unequal power, and identifying safe responses rather than merely naming desirable virtues.
An applied approach must also distinguish disagreement from discrimination. A dispute over arrangements for a shared event may permit negotiation; threatening someone because of their religion requires protection and accountability. Asking a targeted child simply to forgive could conceal this difference. Peace education should therefore examine power as well as feelings and should never turn tolerance into an obligation for minorities to accommodate threats or surrender equal treatment.
An alternative approach would connect learning within a religious tradition with learning about the traditions of others. The OSCE’s Toledo Guiding Principles distinguish impartial teaching about religions and beliefs from confessional instruction. Applied carefully, this offers a framework for shared learning without demanding theological agreement or participation in another community’s worship. Bangladesh’s Article 41(2), which protects pupils from compulsory instruction or worship relating to another religion, must inform curriculum design. Any shared component requires legal scrutiny and meaningful safeguards for freedom of conscience.
Accurate comparative content should extend beyond lists of founders, scriptures, and festivals. It could present how Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian neighbours understand service, suffering, responsibility, and disagreement while recognising variation within each tradition. Indigenous traditions and nonreligious perspectives also require consideration. Comparison should neither rank religions nor erase their differences through the claim that all teach exactly the same thing. Its purpose would be to enable students to describe another person’s position accurately without being required to adopt it. Consultation should include scholars, teachers, and diverse community members rather than treating a single representative as the definitive voice of a faith.
Values could then be connected to structured, age-appropriate situations. Consider a fictional classroom messaging group where an edited image allegedly insults a religion. Instead of asking only whether spreading rumours is wrong, an exercise could ask pupils to distinguish an allegation from verified evidence, explain why collective blame is unjustified, and identify an appropriate adult reporting route. Students could practise a response that supports a threatened classmate without forwarding harmful material. They should never be expected to confront a violent crowd or investigate a dangerous allegation themselves.
Dialogue exercises could also address disagreement over a school celebration or exclusion from a group activity. Assessment would consider whether pupils listen, represent different perspectives fairly, identify rights, and propose workable responses. Reflective writing could explain why a proposed solution might disadvantage someone. Such tasks would make the connection between moral knowledge and practical judgement visible rather than assuming that a correct definition of tolerance demonstrates tolerant conduct.
Implementation depends on educators, but personal religiosity should not be equated with professional incapacity. The relevant question is whether a teacher can distinguish personal conviction from the obligation to represent others fairly. The Toledo principles identify the need for specialist knowledge, reflection on bias, and continuing professional development. Training should therefore involve rehearsing difficult discussions, responding to misinformation, and recognising when a supposedly balanced debate legitimises prejudice. Teachers also need permission to acknowledge uncertainty and consult reliable sources rather than improvising theological answers.
Classroom safety requires equal attention. A minority pupil should not become the compulsory spokesperson for an entire religion or be asked to disclose traumatic experiences. Dialogue must allow disagreement while preventing threats, humiliation, and collective blame. UNESCO’s teacher guidance supports inclusive discussion and critical inquiry; translating those principles locally would require clear ground rules, confidential reporting, and accessible support. A teacher confronting an inflammatory allegation should be able to pause the activity and seek institutional assistance without facing disciplinary or community reprisals. “Open discussion” cannot mean leaving vulnerable pupils responsible for defending their right to belong.
Practical constraints must also be anticipated. Large classes, limited time, and assessment pressures may restrict discussion; community objections may arise when learning about another religion is mistaken for religious conversion. A feasible design would therefore require explanatory materials for parents, protected teaching time, school leadership support, and activities suitable for different resource settings. Pilot programmes should examine classroom interaction, student understanding, and complaints before wider adoption. Implementation evidence must test whether these safeguards work rather than assuming that distributing revised textbooks constitutes successful reform.
Schools would also need to examine their own everyday practices. An exercise about inclusion loses credibility if pupils encounter discriminatory seating, ridicule, or unequal opportunities within the institution. These are issues for investigation, not assumptions about every school. Monitoring should therefore include pupils’ confidential accounts alongside teachers’ reports, recognising that a formally peaceful classroom may still contain exclusion that students feel unable to challenge.
Religious education cannot substitute for public protection, accountability, or equal treatment. Its contribution is more specific: it can connect moral commitments to practised judgement in encounters with difference. The task is not to replace faith with a vocabulary of harmony, but to examine whether pupils learn to recognise prejudice, question inflammatory claims, and protect others’ dignity. The meaningful measure is what students can do when peaceful coexistence becomes difficult.